Case 2:13-cv-00480-MJP Document 46 Filed 11/05/13 Page 1 of 13

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

8
9
10

JO ELLEN PETERS, et. al.,

11
12
13
14

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. C13-480-MJP
ORDER COMPELLING
ARBITRATION

v.
AMAZON SERVICES LLC,
Defendant.

15
16

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Amazon Service LLC‟s motion to

17 compel arbitration. (Dkt. No. 17.) Having reviewed the motion, Plaintiffs‟ response (Dkt. No.
18 27), Defendant‟s reply (Dkt. No. 32), and all related papers, and having heard oral argument on
19 October 24, 2013, the Court GRANTS the motion, finding Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate their
20 dispute with Amazon. The Court therefore orders the matter to arbitration and STAYS the case.
Background

21
22

Plaintiffs are former third-party Amazon.com sellers. (Dkt. No. 16.) They sue Amazon

23 alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of Washington‟s Consumer
24 Protection Act, and unjust enrichment. (Id.) The complaint is brought on behalf of a putative
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1 class of persons who “opened a seller account with Amazon and…for whom Amazon has
2 received Payment Transaction funds for at least one buyer on the Amazon.com website since
3 March 15, 2009.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiffs also seek to represent a putative subclass of:
4
5
6
7

[A]ll persons or entities in the U.S. (1) who were provided written notice from
Amazon that the account had been suspended; (2) who, at the time of such notice,
had funds on account with Amazon; and (3) Amazon did not transmit such funds
to the seller by the shorter of (a) 90 days following the initial date the account was
suspended by Amazon, or (b) the date on which the seller was provided written
notification that Amazon‟s review was complete and the decision to close the
account was final.

8
(Id. at 9.) Plaintiffs amended their complaint in April 2013. (Id.)
9
1. Mr. Lane‟s Seller Accounts
10
Plaintiff Ken Lane first became an amazon.com seller in January 15, 2010. (Dkt. No. 18
11
at 2.) In opening his seller account, he agreed to the terms of the Participation Agreement. (Dkt.
12
No. 18 at 4.) The Participation Agreement established eligibility for sellers, applicable policies,
13
described Amazon‟s role in facilitating a marketplace, and the terms regarding transactions,
14
seller taxes, and refunds/returns, among other subjects. (Dkt. No. 18-3). Pertinent to the instant
15
motion, the Marketplace Participation Agreement contained a choice of law provision and forum
16
selection clause:
17
18
19
20
21

The laws of the state of Washington govern this Participation Agreement and all
of its terms and conditions, without giving effect to any principles of conflicts of
laws or the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Any
dispute with Amazon or its affiliates relating in any way to these terms and
conditions or your use of the Services in which the aggregate total claim for relief
sought on behalf of one or more parties exceeds $7,500 shall be adjudicated in
any state or federal court in King County, Washington, and you consent to
exclusive jurisdiction and venue in such courts.

22
(Id. at 8.)
23
24
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1

For the next two years, Mr. Lane marketed, sold, and shipped aviation-related equipment

2 using amazon.com. In April 2012, Amazon notified Mr. Lane that it had received complaints
3 from other members of the amazon.com community about emails he had sent. (Dkt. No. 19-1 at
4 14.) Amazon investigated and determining he was conspiring with others to price-fix. (Id. at
5 18.) It then suspended Mr. Lane‟s account. (Id. at 3.) Mr. Lane alleges when the suspension
6 occurred, Amazon was in possession of money for pending sales. (Dkt. No. 16 at 9.) Mr. Lane
7 appealed the suspension. (Id.) Shortly after, Amazon notified Mr. Lane that the suspension was
8 permanent. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3.) Mr. Lane demanded Amazon pay him the amounts it had
9 collected from his final sales. (Dkt. No. 16 at 9.)
10

Five days after Amazon closed his 2010 account, Mr. Lane opened a second one. (Dkt.

11 No. 19 at 3-4.) To open that account, Mr. Lane was presented with the Business Solutions
12 Agreement (“BSA”), an agreement setting the terms for the Amazon/seller relationship. (Dkt.
13 No. 18 at 2.) The seller signup page included the following:
14
15

Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement: □ I have read and accepted the
terms and conditions of the Agreement.
(Id.) The underlined word “Agreement” included a hyperlink to the BSA. Mr. Lane clicked the

16
box indicating he had read the BSA and agreed to its terms. (Id.) Pertinent to the pending
17

motion is the BSA‟s choice of law and forum selection provisions:

18
19
20
21

Any dispute with Amazon or its affiliates or claim relating in any way to this
Agreement or your use of the Services shall be adjudicated in the Governing
Courts, … or, if Your Elected Country is the United States, we both consent that
any such dispute or claim will be resolved by binding arbitration as described in
this paragraph, rather than in court, except that you may assert claims in a small
claims court that is a Governing Court …

22
(Dkt. No. 18-1 at 5.) The BSA defined arbitration as:
23
24
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1
2
3
4
5
6

There is no judge or jury in arbitration, and court review of an arbitration award is
limited. However, an arbitrator can award on an individual basis the same
damages and relief as a court (including injunctive and declaratory relief or
statutory damages) …
(Id.) Sellers who execute the BSA also give up the ability to pursue collective action:
We each agree that any dispute resolution proceedings will be conducted only on
an individual basis and not on a class, consolidate or representative class action.
If for any reason, a claim proceeds in court, rather than arbitration we each waive
any right to a jury trial.

7
(Id. at 6.)
8

Because Amazon had already suspended Mr. Lane‟s selling privileges, it blocked the

9
second account. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3.) Mr. Lane then opened a third account. (Id. at 4) Again,
10
during the sign-up process, he was required to click on a box indicating he had read and agreed
11
to the terms of the BSA. Amazon again blocked this account. (Id.) In total, after June 2012, Mr.
12
Lane opened four new seller accounts. In each instance, he clicked a box to indicating he had
13
read and agreed to the BSA. Mr. Lane though, never sold through any of these accounts,
14
because Amazon blocked and terminated each one. (Dkt. No. 19 at 3-4.)
15

2. Ms. Peters‟ Seller Account

16
Ms. Peters opened an Amazon seller account in October 2012. (Dkt. 16 at 7.) In opening
17
this account Ms. Peters agreed to the terms of the BSA by clicking a box (identical to the one
18
presented to Ms. Lane) indicating she assented to its terms. (Dkt. No. 18 at 2.) The BSA
19
contained a choice of law provision identical to the one agreed to by Mr. Lane. It stipulated to
20
arbitration of any dispute. (Id.)
21

Using amazon.com, Ms. Peters sold “hard to find DVDs.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) Her first

22
sale occurred October 15, 2012. Less than a month later, Amazon informed Ms. Peters it was
23
suspending her account. (Dkt. No. 16 at 8.) Amazon provided no reason, other than Ms. Peters‟
24
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1 account failing the seller review process. (Dkt. No. 19-1 at 4.) Ms. Peters appealed. (Id.) At
2 the time of the suspension, Plaintiffs allege Amazon was in possession of funds from Ms. Peters‟
3 sales. (Dkt. No. 16 at 8.) Amazon closed the account on November 8, 2012. (Id.) Ms. Peters
4 demanded Amazon forward the money owing from her few sales. (Id.) She argued timely
5 remittance was required by the Participation Agreement. (Dkt. No. 29-2 at 53.)
6
7

3. Procedural Posture
Plaintiffs filed this case in March 2013. (Dkt. No. 1.) They allege Amazon requires its

8 sellers, like Mr. Lane and Ms. Peters, to use its payment transmission services for sales on
9 amazon.com but do not timely remit money collected from their buyers. (Dkt. No. 16 at 3.)
10 Plaintiffs allege this practice violates the Uniform Money Services Act, Washington‟s Consumer
11 Protection Act, is a breach of contract, and unjustly enriches Amazon. (Id. at 14-26.) Plaintiffs
12 seek a monetary award as well as a declaratory judgment. (Id.)
13

Defendant Amazon now moves to compel arbitration on the basis that Plaintiffs agreed to

14 the BSA, which stipulates to resolving any dispute on an individual basis in binding arbitration.
15 (Dkt. No. 17 at 1.)
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Analysis
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court‟s role is “limited to determining (1) whether a
valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the
dispute at issue.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.
2000) (citation omitted). If the answer to both questions is „yes,‟ then “the Act requires the court
to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id. By its own terms, the Act
“leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court,” instead it mandates “that
district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration

24
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1 agreement has been signed.” Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218
2 (1985)) (emphasis in original).
3

In the Ninth Circuit, “the most minimal indication of the parties‟ intent to arbitrate must

4 be given full effect ...” Rep. of Nicaragua v. Std. Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 478 (9th Cir. 1991)
5 (citations omitted). It is well established “that where the contract contains an arbitration clause,
6 there is a presumption of arbitrability,” particularly where the clause is broad. AT & T Techs.,
7 Inc. v. Commc‟ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986). Indeed, “doubts should be
8 resolved in favor of coverage.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). However, “the party seeking
9 to enforce an arbitration agreement bears the burden of showing that the agreement exists and
10 that its terms bind the other party.” Gelow v. Cent. Pac. Mortg. Corp., 560 F.Supp.2d 972, 978
11 (E.D.Cal. 2008). “This burden is a substantial one[.]” Id. at 979. “Before a party to a lawsuit
12 can be ordered to arbitrate ..., there should be an express, unequivocal agreement to that effect ...
13 The district court ... should give to the opposing party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
14 inferences that may arise.” Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d
15 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1991))
16
17

1. Is there a valid Agreement to Arbitrate?
There is. In determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, Courts apply ordinary

18 state-law contract principals. Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
19 Washington courts apply the manifest theory of contract interpretation: “[t]he role of the court is
20 to determine the mutual intentions of the parties according to the reasonable meaning of their
21 words and acts.” Fisher Props. Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 106 Wn.2d 826, 837 (1986) (citing
22 Dwelley v. Chesterfield, 88 Wn.2d 331 (1977)).
23

The intent of the parties to a contract “may be discovered not only from the actual

24 language of the agreement, but also from „viewing the contract as a whole, the subject matter and
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1 objective of the contract, all circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, the
2 subsequent acts and conduct of the parties to the contract, and the reasonableness of respective
3 interpretations advocated by the parties.‟” Bort v. Parker, 110 Wn. App. 561, 573 (2002)
4 (citations omitted). In interpreting an arbitration clause, the intentions of the parties as expressed
5 in the agreement controls, but “those intentions are generously construed as to issues of
6 arbitrability.” W.A. Botting Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Constructors–Pamco, 47 Wn. App.
7 681, 684 (1987) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
8 614, 626 (1985)).
9
10
11
12

The BSA contains a broad forum selection clause mandating arbitration:
Any dispute with Amazon or its affiliates or claim relating in any way to this
Agreement or your use of the Services shall be adjudicated in the Governing
Courts, … or, if Your Elected Country is the United States, we both consent that
any such dispute or claim will be resolved by binding arbitration as described in
this paragraph, rather than in court, except that you may assert claims in a small
claims court that is a Governing Court …

13
(Dkt. No. 18-1 at 5.)
14
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs agreed to the BSA, including its forum selection clause.
15
Ms. Peters agreed to the BSA when she opened her seller account in October 2012. Mr. Lane
16
did so four times from June 2012 to January 2013. (Dkt. No. 19 at 4.) Indeed, neither could
17
have opened their accounts without agreeing to the BSA in its entity. (Id.; Dkt. No. 18.)
18
Notwithstanding their clear agreement to the arbitration provision, Plaintiffs argue the
19
20
21

Participation Agreement‟s jurisdictional mandate controls over the BSA. Plaintiffs point to a
provision in the BSA stating that if there is a conflict “between the Program Policies and this
Agreement, the Program Policies will prevail.” (Dkt. No. 27 at 17.) The starting point for

22
Plaintiffs theory is the BSA, which defines a Program Policy as:
23
24

all terms, conditions, policies, guidelines, rules and other information on the
Amazon Site or on Seller Central, including those shown on the “Policies and

ORDER COMPELLING ARBITRATION- 7

Case 2:13-cv-00480-MJP Document 46 Filed 11/05/13 Page 8 of 13

1
2

Agreements” section of Seller Central or elsewhere in the “Help” section of Seller
Central (and, for purposes of the Fulfillment by Amazon Service, specifically
including the FBA Guidelines). All Program Policies applicable to WebStore by
Amazon also apply to Amazon WebStore, unless otherwise specifically stated.

3
4 (Id. at 8). Plaintiffs also turn to a second definition in the BSA, which defines the Amazon site
5 as “that website, the primary home page of which is identified by the applicable one of the
6 following (and any successor or replacement of such websites):…the URL www.amazon.com...”
7 (Dkt. No. 27 at 15, quoting Dkt. No. 18-1 at 7.) Plaintiffs‟ attorneys attest to having reached the
8 Participation Agreement by using the search engine Google and searching for the term “Amazon
9 Seller Help.” (Dkt. No. 29 at 2.) Likewise, Plaintiffs‟ counsel also attests to having located the
10 Participation Agreement by accessing it through a paralegal‟s amazon.com seller home page.
11 (Id. at 3.) By connecting six hyperlinks in the “help” and “other links” tab, counsel was able to
12 locate the Participation Agreement. (Id.; see also Dkt. No. 45.) According to Plaintiffs, because
13 the Participation Agreement is available on the Amazon website, it is a Program Policy. (Dkt.
14 No. 27 at 11.)
15

This argument is flawed for at least three reasons. First, what matters for the present

16 motion is the agreement Plaintiffs intended, as manifested by the contract language. State Dep‟t
17 of Corr. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 160 Wn.2d 786, 795 (2007) (Court‟s must “carry out the intent of
18 the parties as manifested … by the parties‟ own contract language.”) Here, the BSA‟s contract
19 language evidences no intent for the Participation Agreement to be a “Program Policy.” Instead,
20 in referring to the Participation Agreement, the BSA uses the term “Seller Agreement.” (Dkt.
21 No. 18-1 at 22.) By clearly defining the Participation Agreement as a “Seller Agreement,” and
22 not a “Program Policy,” the BSA‟s plain language avoids the ambiguity Plaintiffs now attempt to
23 raise. Mayer v. Pierce County Medical Bureau, Inc., 80 Wn. App. 416, 421 (1995) (A contract
24 provision, however, is not ambiguous simply because the parties suggest opposing meanings;
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1 and “we will not read ambiguity into a contract where it can reasonably be avoided.”) Nothing
2 offered by Plaintiffs contravenes that reasonable interpretation. Interstate Prod. Credit Ass‟n v.
3 MacHugh, 90 Wn. App. 650, 654 (1998) (“If only one reasonable meaning can be ascribed to the
4 agreement when viewed in context, that meaning necessarily reflects the parties‟ intent ….”).
5

Second, Plaintiffs‟ theory that any information on the amazon.com website is a “Program

6 Policy” is out of step with basic contract interpretation principles to avoid absurd results. Eurick
7 v. Pemco Ins. Co., 108 Wn.2d 338, 341 (1987) (Courts must “avoid a “strained or forced
8 construction” of the agreement and avoid interpretations “leading to absurd results.”) The basic
9 premise of Plaintiffs‟ argument is that any information contained in the Amazon site, which
10 addresses selling in Amazon meets the definition of a Program Policy. If this were true, a seller
11 would not know to what he or she had agreed, short of reading every screen on the Amazon
12 website and Seller Central (and doing so repeatedly to keep apprised of any changes). The Court
13 finds this possibility an absurd result, and declines to adopt such an interpretation of the BSA.
14

Third, Amazon‟s reply neutralizes Plaintiffs‟ factual representations. Amazon offers

15 credible evidence that only Legacy Sellers (those sellers who signed up before 11/2011 and have
16 not agreed to the BSA, like Plaintiffs‟ counsel Mr. Hayes) can access the Participation
17 Agreement from their “Seller Central.” (Dkt. No. 34.) It is simply not available in the Policies
18 and Agreements page or Help page for those sellers who signed up under the BSA. (Id.)
19 Amazon also explains that to reach the Participation Agreement (other than using the Google
20 search engine) Plaintiffs‟ counsel had to exit the “Seller Central” and reach other “help” pages.
21 (Id.) The Court therefore finds that while the some sellers may be able to reach the Participation
22 Agreement through use of a search engine or as Legacy Sellers, Amazon did not hold it out as
23 applicable to all sellers and readily available to all sellers.
24
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1

Plaintiffs argue that any ambiguity in the contract should be read against Amazon. (Dkt.

2 No. 27 at 22.) While it is a basic tenant of contract law that the ambiguities in a contract are
3 construed against the drafter, that maxim does not apply here. Plaintiffs‟ misapplication of the
4 ambiguity doctrine is demonstrated by their reliance on cases factually and legally
5 distinguishable. In Stephens v. TES Franchising, 2002 WL 1608281, at *2-3 (D. Conn. July 10,
6 2002), in applying Connecticut law, the court found ambiguity on the face of the agreement
7 because as “Section XX (entitled „Arbitration‟) provides that all disputes (with the exception of
8 trademark issues) must be decided by arbitration, but ¶ 22.01(a) expressly provides that the
9 parties „agree to submit any dispute between them to the jurisdiction and venue of a court of
10 competent jurisdiction.‟” Here, unlike Stephens, Plaintiffs do not present the Court with two
11 competing provisions within the same document, which makes the agreement internally
12 incongruous. Instead, Plaintiffs agreed to the BSA, which contains only one, unambiguous,
13 forum selection clause; the ambiguity doctrine does not apply. See Hanson Indus., Inc. v.
14 County of Spokane, 114 Wn. App. 523 (Div. 3 2002). By this same reasoning, the other case
15 discussed at length by Plaintiffs, Christianson v. Poly-America, 2002 WL 31421684 (D.Minn.
16 Oct. 25, 2002), is off point.
17

Finally, Plaintiffs are incorrect in suggesting factual disputes preclude this Court from

18 compelling arbitration. At oral argument Plaintiffs‟ counsel suggested the record here is akin to
19 Kwan v. Clearwire Corp., 2012 WL 32380 (W.D.Wash Jan. 3. 2012), and the intention of the
20 parties is unknown. In Kwan, Judge Robart declined to compel arbitration and ordered an
21 evidentiary hearing when the parties stipulated to the existence of a factual dispute regarding
22 plaintiffs‟ assent to the agreement. Kwan, 2012 WL 32380 at *10. In contrast, no factual
23 dispute exists here as to Plaintiffs‟ execution of the BSA.
24
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1

In sum, the Court finds a valid agreement to arbitrate. Given that finding, the Court does

2 not reach the merits of the parties‟ arguments as to the arbitration clause in the amazon.com
3 conditions of use.
4

2. Do Plaintiffs‟ claims fall within the scope of the clause?

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

They do. “[A]n order to arbitrate ... should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.” AT & T Techs., Inc. v.
Comm'cns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Nov. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960)); see Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 584–
85 (“In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, ...
only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can
prevail....”). The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of showing that the agreement does
not cover the claims at issue. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91–92
(2000).
The BSA mandates:
Any dispute with Amazon or its affiliates or claim relating in any way to this
Agreement or your use of the Services …will be resolved in binding arbitration.

18 (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 5.) The BSA defines “Service” to mean “Selling on Amazon.com, Amazon
19 Webstore, Fullfillment by Amazon, and any related services we make available.” (Id. at 8.) The
20 BSA‟s arbitration clause clearly covers Plaintiffs‟ claims because they directly relate to their use
21 of Amazon‟s services.
22

Plaintiffs, however, suggest Mr. Lane‟s dispute falls outside the scope of the arbitration

23 provision because he executed that agreement only after the suspension of his first account.
24 They argue his claims are instead governed by the Participation Agreement. At first, this
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1 argument has appeal. But, two provisions of the BSA render it meritless. First, the BSA
2 contains an integration clause, making it the “entire agreement between the parties,” and
3 “supersedes any previous or contemporaneous oral or written agreements and understandings.”
4 (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 6.) Second, the BSA‟s arbitration provision is broad, applying to any dispute
5 between the parties. It is plainly not limited to prospective disputes. See, e.g., Green v. W.R.M.
6 & Assocs., Ltd., 174 F. Supp. 2d 459, 463 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (where plaintiff was “clearly aware
7 of [the defendant‟s] past wrongdoing … at the time of signing the Arbitration Agreement”
8 concerning “[a]ny dispute,” “[t]his is consistent with the parties‟ intentions to give up their rights
9 to sue in court for all of their potential claims, whether they occurred before or after signing of
10 the agreement”); Whisler v. H.J. Meyers & Co., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 798, 801-02 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
11 (rejecting plaintiffs‟ argument that arbitration agreement could not be applied to transactions that
12 occurred prior to their signing of the account agreement, where agreement related to “any
13 controversy arising out of or relating to any of my accounts,” a statement that “speaks in terms of
14 relationships and not timing”) (internal quotation omitted). Here, when Mr. Lane executed the
15 BSA and agreed to arbitrate any dispute, he was already aware of the facts underlying this case
16 including Amazon‟s alleged failure to timely remit buyer funds. (See e.g. Dkt. No. 19-1 at 18,
17 22-23.) Consequently, his claims fall with the scope of the arbitration provision.
18
19

Conclusion
Because the parties agreed to arbitration and Plaintiffs‟ claims clearly fall within the

20 scope of that arbitration provision, the Court GRANTS the motion to compel arbitration (Dkt.
21 No. 17). The Court also STAYS the matter for a period of 6 months or until arbitration is
22 complete, whichever comes first, so that Plaintiffs can pursue their claims in arbitration. The
23
24
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1 parties are ORDERED to provide a status report to the Court regarding arbitration by May 2,
2 2014.
3

The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.

4

Dated this 5th day of November, 2013.

A

5
6

Marsha J. Pechman
Chief United States District Judge

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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